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I. Introduction and Overview 
In 2003, the New York City Department of Education (NYCDOE)—the largest public 
school district in the nation—embarked on a unique experiment to increase its pool of qualified 
school administrators. Through the creation of the New York City Leadership Academy (the 
Leadership Academy), the district asserted significantly greater responsibility for training and 
developing its own school leaders (Olson, 2007).  
Like many cities, New York suffers from a persistent shortage of principals, due to high 
turnover, a surge in retirements, and the rapid creation of new schools (Papa, Lankford, and 
Wyckoff, 2002; Lankford, O’Connell, and Wyckoff, 2003). The Leadership Academy—an 
independent, not-for-profit organization—represents the centerpiece of New York City’s attempts 
to expand its principal labor pool while at the same time increasing the autonomy and day-to-day 
responsibilities of its school leaders. Its programs are together aimed at recruiting, preparing, and 
supporting the professional development of aspiring and sitting principals. In particular, the 
Leadership Academy seeks to prepare principals for schools marked by high student poverty, low 
achievement and frequent staff turnover—schools in which principal vacancies had been historically 
hard to fill. Today, the Leadership Academy works with hundreds of principals annually and its 
Aspiring Principals Program graduates are currently responsible for 15 percent of the city’s schools.1 
Aspiring Principals (APP), the Leadership Academy’s pre-service principal preparation 
program, is a 14-month intensive program involving three components.2  The first is the summer 
intensive, where participants work on simulated school projects intended to mimic the realities of an 
actual principalship.  The second component, the residency, involves a ten-month ―apprenticeship‖ 
                                                 
1 http://www.nycleadershipacademy.org/overview/overview [last accessed June 2, 2009]. 
2 http://www.nycleadershipacademy.org/aspiringprincipals/app_overview [last accessed: May 12, 2009].  
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with an experienced principal, along with bi-weekly leadership development seminars. Finally, the 
planning summer allows participants an opportunity to transition to their school leadership position.  
 This report represents the first systematic comparison of student outcomes in schools led by 
APP graduates after three years to those in comparable schools led by other new principals. We 
provide both a straightforward comparison of average achievement in these two groups of schools, 
and in efforts to isolate a potential program effect, we conduct a formal regression analysis that 
accounts for pre-existing differences in student performance and characteristics. We also report key 
differences between the school leaders themselves and the schools in which they were placed. All 
principals in this study were installed in 2004-05 or 2005-06, remained in the same school for three 
or more consecutive years, and led their school through the 2007-08 school year. 
We find that the first two cohorts of APP principals were placed in schools that were 
demographically, geographically, and academically distinct from comparison schools led by other 
new principals. In keeping with the Leadership Academy’s mission of placing graduates in the 
hardest-to-staff schools, APP principals were more likely to be placed in schools that were low-
performing, relative to both the citywide average and to schools receiving a new principal at the 
same time. Moreover, the average APP elementary/middle school was trending downward in both 
English Language Arts (ELA) and mathematics scores, relative to the citywide average, before APP 
principals took the helm.  
During the period of this study, New York City schools as a whole improved their average 
annual state assessment scores in both ELA and mathematics, and students in schools that 
experienced a leadership transition during this time experienced gains as well. However, controlling 
for pre-existing differences in student demographics and achievement, we find that APP principals 
bettered their comparison group counterparts in ELA performance, trending upward apace with 
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overall city-wide gains.3 Whereas comparison schools, while also posting gains, fell further behind 
the rest of the city in their third and fourth years, APP schools remained stable, and by the third year 
the difference in these schools’ trajectories becomes statistically significant. In mathematics, both 
groups’ scores improved over time, although comparison principals’ schools trended slightly better 
in the years following the arrival of their new principal, with differences that are small and most 
often not statistically significant. At the high school level, we find minor and inconclusive 
differences in achievement between APP and comparison schools.  
 
In brief, our study finds: 
 APP and comparison principals have different characteristics 
o APP principals are younger and more likely to be black than those in the 
comparison group. The average age of APP principals in the study was 40.9, as 
compared with 44.4 for comparison principals. Forty-one percent of APP principals 
were black versus 29 percent of comparison principals. 
o Both APP and comparison principals had substantial experience in the classroom. 
However, APP principals had three fewer years of teaching experience on average 
than comparison principals, at 7.3 versus 10.3 years. 
o APP principals were unlikely to have served as an assistant principal. Seventy-eight 
percent of APP principals had no prior experience as an assistant principal, while 
most comparison principals (82 percent) had some experience in this position. 
Comparison principals had also worked at their respective schools longer, in 
positions other than principal. 
 APP and comparison principals were placed in schools with different demographic profiles 
                                                 
3As explained in Section II, we refer to ―APP schools‖ as schools that were eventually led by an APP principal in our 
study. ―Comparison schools‖ are schools that were eventually led by a non-APP novice principal. 
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o In elementary and secondary schools, APP principals were more likely to be located 
in the Bronx (32 percent versus 18 percent of comparison principals), while 
comparison principals were more likely to be found in Brooklyn and Queens. APP 
principals in high schools were more likely to be working at schools in Manhattan 
than comparison high school principals. 
o APP schools enrolled fewer Asian and white students than comparison schools, and 
had a significantly greater share of black students (43 percent in APP schools versus 
31 percent in comparison schools). On average, APP schools were smaller than 
comparison schools, at both the elementary/middle and high school levels. 
 APP and comparison principals were placed in schools with different performance levels 
and histories 
o Schools in which APP principals were placed exhibited lower initial levels of 
performance than comparison principals’ schools, an achievement gap that preceded 
the arrival of these new principals. The average APP elementary and middle school 
student performed substantially below their citywide grade level average in ELA and 
mathematics in the years before their new principal, while students in comparison 
schools scored approximately at citywide grade-level average. These pre-existing 
differences are evident regardless of whether one compares scale scores, proficiency 
rates, or standardized scores.4 
o Elementary and middle schools in which APP principals were placed were generally 
on a sharp downward trend in mathematics and ELA—relative to the citywide 
average—in the years preceding the new principal. This was especially evident for 
                                                 
4 For most of our analysis we use average standardized scores as our measure of student achievement. These 
scores indicate how far the average student in a school scored from his/her citywide grade level average, in 
standard deviation units. As we explain in Section V, these scores are the best suited to making comparisons 
across tests, grades, and years. 
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the 2005 cohort of APP schools. Comparison schools, by contrast, experienced 
relatively stable performance in these subjects prior to their new principal. 
 In the initial years of their leadership, elementary and middle school APP principals had 
comparable or better growth trends than comparison principals  
o Controlling for pre-existing differences in student demographics and achievement, 
APP principals bettered their comparison group counterparts in ELA, trending 
upward apace with overall city-wide gains. Whereas comparison schools fell further 
behind the rest of the city in their third and fourth years, APP schools remained 
stable, and by the third year the difference in these schools’ trajectories is statistically 
significant. In mathematics, both APP and comparison schools scores improved 
over time, although APP schools trended slightly worse following the arrival of their 
new principal. These differences, however, are small and not consistently statistically 
significant.  
 School performance differences at the high school level are small and mostly inconclusive  
o APP and comparison high schools differed in their average state Regents’ Exam 
scores, proportions of students taking Regents exams, and graduation rates, both 
before and after the arrival of their new principal. The significance of these 
differences, however, is inconclusive, given the small sample of high school 
principals in the study. 
 
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Section II describes how APP and 
comparison principals were selected for inclusion in the study. Section III contrasts the average 
characteristics of APP principals with those of other novice principals selected as our comparison 
group. Sections IV and V use administrative data from NYCDOE to provide a baseline comparison 
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of students and schools served by APP and comparison principals. Section VI is a descriptive 
analysis of average student achievement in APP and comparison schools, both in the principals’ 
initial year and in years before and after the arrival of the new principal. Finally, sections VII and 
VIII provide a formal regression analysis of student achievement in APP and comparison schools. 
 
II. Description of the Data and Sample 
 The primary goal of this report is to compare schools led by Aspiring Principals Program 
(APP) graduates to comparable schools led by non-APP principals. In this section, we describe how 
principals and schools were selected for this analysis. The first step required the identification of 
APP and non-APP principals with comparable years of experience leading a school (roughly 2.8 – 
4.6 years). The second involved further limiting this group to those who led one school for a 
sufficient time to be meaningfully evaluated.5 The final step involved matching principals to student 
outcomes in administrative data from the NYCDOE. 
 For most of the schools in our analysis, we have measured outcomes for years prior to the 
new principal’s installation and years following his or her arrival. Having both of these measures 
allows for a ―pre‖ and ―post‖ comparison of outcomes within the same schools. Throughout this 
report, we refer to schools eventually led by an APP principal as ―APP schools.‖ ―Comparison 
schools‖ are schools eventually led by a comparison principal. Both APP and comparison schools 
are observed before and after the arrival of their new principal. Only ―post‖ outcome measures are 
available for new schools. While we include new schools in our descriptive analyses, we are unable to 
include these schools in ―pre‖ and ―post‖ comparisons.6 
                                                 
5Our requirement that principals remain in one school for three consecutive years is based on the notion that it takes 
time to see evidence of school improvement in student test scores. Scholars of school improvement (e.g. Fullan and 
Stiegelbauer, 1991) suggest three years as the minimum amount of time needed to see such results. 
6 In future work, we hope to use student-level data to provide a baseline level of achievement for principals leading new 
schools. 
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Selection of APP and comparison principals 
For this study, we restricted our attention to graduates of the first two cohorts of the Aspiring 
Principals Program (2004 and 2005) who became principals in 2004-05 and 2005-06, remained with 
the same school for three or more consecutive years, and continued as principals in 2007-08. 
Comparison principals were also required to meet these criteria to be included. Because of these 
restrictions, not all principals who began service in these years are represented in this analysis. Of the 
147 graduates in the 2004 and 2005 APP cohorts, 88 percent (n=130) were placed as a school 
principal at the time of our study. Sixty percent (n=88) met our strict inclusion criteria.7 The other 
40 percent (n=59) are excluded for a variety of reasons, as summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1: Core sample of APP graduates 
 
 
 
N 
 
% 
   
Number of APP graduates, 2005 and 2006 cohorts 147 100.0 
APP graduates included in the analysis 86 58.5 
   
Excluded APP graduates:   
   Placed as principal:   
      Currently principal but did not meet 3-year tenure requirement (e.g. switched schools) 15 10.2 
      Met 3-year tenure requirement but not currently principal (e.g. promoted) 2 1.4 
      Served as principal in District 75 school 2 1.4 
      Served as principal and transferred to lateral DOE position 9 6.1 
      Served as principal and then exited DOE 6 4.1 
   Not placed as principals:   
      Served as interim acting principal and/or assistant principal only 13 8.8 
      Placed in other positions (e.g. program director, central administration, or teacher) 9 6.1 
      Served in other position and/or exited DOE 4 2.7 
      Other 1 0.7 
   Total excluded 61 41.5 
 
Source: New York City Leadership Academy.  
 
As shown in Table 1, 13 percent of the 2004 and 2005 APP graduates were initially placed as 
principals but were later promoted, transferred to a lateral position in the DOE, or left the NYC 
public school system.8 Another 10.2 percent switched schools during the study period, in some cases 
because their initial placement was to phase-out a chronically low-performing school. Finally, at the 
                                                 
7 Further, 2 of these 88 were placed in District 75 schools, which exclusively serve special education students. These 
principals are excluded from our analysis. This leaves 86 eligible APP principals. 
8 We do not have comparable principal mobility numbers for non-APP principals. Thus it is difficult to say whether the 
60 percent of APP principals who met our strict inclusion criteria is high, low, or about the same as for non-APP 
principals. 
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time of study, 18.3 percent had not become principals in the NYC public schools, but had accepted 
other positions within or outside NYC (including assistant principal, central administration, and 
teaching positions). Of these, about a fifth served as an interim principal before assuming permanent 
positions as assistant principals. 
For our comparison group, we drew from a list of all active NYC principals in 2007-08 and 
identified those who were new principals in 2004-05 or 2005-06, and had remained in the same 
school for three or more years. 371 non-APP principals met these criteria. Of these, 334 led schools 
with grade configurations comparable with those led by APP principals. We refer to the 86 eligible 
APP and 334 eligible comparison principals as our ―combined sample‖ in Panel A of Table 2. 
Table 2: Samples of APP and comparison principals and schools 
 
 
 
APP 
Principals 
Comparison 
Principals 
 
Total 
    
A. Principal data    
Combined sample 86 334 420 
Elementary/middle school sample 69 244 313 
High school sample 22 106 128 
    
B. Principals matchable to schools    
Elementary/middle school sample 69 230 299 
High school sample 22 105 127 
    
 
The full combined sample of principals is used in Section III to provide a descriptive 
contrast of APP and comparison principals.9 However, for our analysis of schools in Sections IV - 
VIII, we split principals into two groups: those in schools serving elementary and middle grades and 
those serving high school students. Panel A of Table 2 shows the counts of principals in each group, 
while Figure 1 shows the distribution of principals across five school configurations: elementary 
(PK-6), elementary / middle school combination (PK-9), middle school (MS), middle school / high 
school combination (MS/HS), and high school (HS).  
                                                 
9 While comparisons by level add little beyond comparisons of APP and comparison principals in the combined sample, 
we do provide separate descriptive statistics by level in Appendix Table 1. 
10          AUGUST 2009 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of APP and comparison principals by school level 
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                         Notes: combined sample of principals, N=420 (86 APP and 334 CP). 
 
 
APP and comparison principals were similarly distributed across school configurations, 
although APP principals were more likely to be working in middle schools than comparison 
principals (32.6 percent versus 21.0 percent), and less likely to be working in high schools (19.8 
percent versus 26.9 percent). Because combination middle / high schools fall into both subsamples, 
these schools are included in both analyses. 
 
Matching to school-level data 
In order to compare school outcomes, it was necessary to match the principals identified in 
Panel A of Table 2 to administrative data from the NYCDOE. Fifteen of 334 comparison principals 
were not successfully matched to school-level data while 100 percent of APP principals were.10 After 
                                                 
10 The unmatched schools were coded as serving the middle school grades (3 level MS and 11 MS/HS), but in practice 
had no data available for middle school students. This may simply be due to miscodes in the school reports. 
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matching we are left with 69 APP and 230 comparison schools in the elementary / middle school 
sample, and 22 APP and 105 comparison principals in the high school sample (Panel B of Table 2).11 
Another practical limitation on our data is the number of years for which school results are 
available. For example, principals that began work in 2005-06 have at most three years of results 
under their leadership, while those who began in 2004-05 have up to four.12 Our elementary / 
middle school data series begins in 2002-03, so for some cases we observe schools up to three years 
before the arrival of their new principal (for those beginning in 2005-06), while for others we observe 
up to two years prior (for those beginning in 2004-05). For high schools, our data series begins in 
2003-04, so we have at most two years of data prior to the installation of a new principal. New 
schools have no observable data prior to the tenure of the founding principal. Details on data 
availability for schools in each principal cohort are provided in Appendix Table 2. 
 
III. Characteristics of APP and Comparison Principals 
Table 3 provides the average characteristics of APP and comparison principals in our 
combined sample.13  We observe several statistically significant differences in the demographics of 
APP and comparison principals. For example, APP principals were younger and more likely to be 
black than those in the comparison group. As seen in Table 3, 40.7 percent of APP principals were 
black versus 29.3 percent of comparison principals. APP principals were somewhat less likely to be 
Hispanic (12.8 percent versus 17.4 percent) or white (44.2 percent versus 49.1 percent) than 
                                                 
11 Again, the sum of the two APP subsamples (69 + 22 = 91) exceeds our total number of APP principals (86) because 
middle school / high school combination principals are included in both subsamples. 
12 In some cases, principals took leadership of a school in the middle of the school year. We coded those principals who 
joined a school in a given school year as present for the entire year. 
13 A comparison of principals by school level adds little beyond the information provided by the combined sample. We 
do, however, provide these statistics in Appendix Table 1. As this table shows, elementary / middle school principals 
(both APP and comparison) were less likely to be male than high school principals. APP high school principals were less 
likely to be white than APP elementary / middle principals (38.1 percent versus 48.5 percent). Comparison principals in 
the high schools were less experienced as teachers and assistant principals than their elementary/middle school 
counterparts, while APP principals in the high schools tended to have more prior experience than their primary school 
counterparts. 
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comparison principals. (Neither of these differences is statistically significant). A similar proportion 
of principals (31 percent) in both groups are male.  
Table 3: Mean characteristics of APP and comparison principals, all levels, 2007-08 
 
 Mean    SD 
 APP Comparison  p  APP Comparison 
Percent male 31.4 31.1  0.963  - - 
Percent white 44.2 49.1  0.416  - - 
Percent black 40.7 29.3  0.044 ** - - 
Percent Hispanic 12.8 17.4  0.307  - - 
Percent Asian 1.2 2.7  0.406  - - 
Percent American Indian 1.2 1.2  0.979  - - 
        
Age 44.7 48.2  0.001 *** 8.0 8.3 
Years at this school 3.6 5.6  <0.001 *** 1.0 4.3 
Years taught at this school 0.0 0.8  <0.001 *** 0.4 2.8 
Years assistant principal at this school 0.0 1.0  <0.001 *** 0.0 2.1 
Years principal at this school 3.6 3.7  0.218  1.0 0.7 
Total years taught 7.3 10.3  <0.001 *** 5.7 6.0 
Total years assistant principal 0.4 3.2  <0.001 *** 1.1 2.9 
Total years as principal 3.8 3.8  0.470  0.5 0.5 
 
Notes: combined sample of principals, N=420 (86 APP principals and 334 comparison principals). p value is from a t-
test for a difference in means. *** indicates statistically significant difference at the 0.01 level; ** indicates statistically 
significant difference at the 0.05 level. Missing data on age and select experience variables for a small number of APP 
and comparison principals.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates that there is more variation in age among comparison principals and that 
the APP principal distribution leans more toward younger principals. APP principals were younger 
on average than comparison principals, with a mean age of 40.9 years at the start of their service 
versus 44.4 years for the comparison group (a statistically significant difference). Where 29 percent 
of APP principals were age 40 or younger at the start of service, 20 percent of comparison principals 
were this young. Likewise, 45 percent of comparison principals were over age 50 at the start of their 
service, compared with 24 percent of APP principals.  
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Figure 2: Age at start of service as principal, APP and comparison principals 
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                           Notes: combined sample of principals, N=400 (82 APP and 318 CP). Some principals missing age data. 
 
Both groups have substantial experience in the classroom. Together, the group averaged 9.7 
years of teaching experience. However, APP principals on average had three fewer years of teaching 
experience than comparison principals, at 7.3 versus 10.3 years (a statistically significant difference). 
A sharper difference between APP and comparison principals is evident in their experience as 
assistant principals. Seventy-eight percent of APP principals had no prior experience as an assistant 
principal, while most comparison principals (82 percent) had some experience in this position. 
Comparison principals averaged 3.2 years as assistant principal, and 23 percent had worked five or 
more years as assistant principals (see Figure 3). Because we selected principals for the study based 
on their tenure as principal, the APP and comparison samples are balanced with respect to this 
variable, averaging 3.6 years. 
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Figure 3: Distribution of teaching and assistant principal experience, APP and comparison principals 
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Notes: combined sample of principals, N=420 (86 APP and 334 CP). 
 
 
Finally, we observe that comparison principals had worked at their respective schools 
longer—in positions other than principal—than APP principals. Comparison principals had spent 
an average of 5.6 years at their schools, as compared with 3.6 for APP principals. A sizable fraction 
(31 percent) of comparison principals became a principal in the same school where they had worked 
as a teacher or assistant principal. This was true for just one APP principal. Virtually all APP 
principals gained teaching experience in another school.  
Of course, these differences in work experience are an explicit design feature of the Aspiring 
Principals Program—because of labor market shortages particularly in hard-to-staff schools, future 
school leaders are prepared to advance into a principalship faster than they might have through 
other routes. 
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IV. School Characteristics: Elementary and Middle Schools Led by APP 
and Comparison Principals 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the distribution of APP and comparison schools serving elementary and 
middle grades, across boroughs. APP principals were more likely to be located in the Bronx (32 
percent versus 18 percent of comparison principals), while comparison principals were more likely 
to be found in Brooklyn (36 percent versus 28 percent of APP principals) and Queens (22 percent 
versus 16 percent of APP principals).  
Figure 4: Distribution of APP and comparison elementary/middle schools by borough 
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3.9%
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                      Notes: elementary and middle school subsample, N=296 (68 APP and 228 comparison principals). 
 
 
Differences in the characteristics of schools led by these principals partly reflect the different 
communities in which they were located. Panel A of Table 4 summarizes these characteristics using 
school data from the initial year of the principals’ service. All student characteristics shown here are 
based on students in the tested grades only (3 to 8). These grades are of interest because they 
correspond to our later regression analysis of school performance in grades 3 to 8. As long as 
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students in untested grades are not demographically distinct from those in the tested grades within 
the same school, these statistics should approximate those of the school.  
Table 4: Mean characteristics of APP and comparison elementary and middle schools in the initial 
year 
 Mean    
 APP Comparison  p  
A. School and student characteristics      
Enrollment 403.3 439.2  0.467  
Percent white enrollment 4.9 14.3  0.038 ** 
Percent black enrollment 42.9 31.4  0.079 * 
Percent Hispanic enrollment 44.9 40.8  0.547  
Percent Asian/other enrollment 7.0 13.3  0.156  
Percent recent immigrants 6.5 6.5  0.998  
Percent native born 85.1 85.1  0.994  
Percent female 50.2 50.7  0.942  
Percent free lunch eligible 66.7 59.5  0.289  
Percent limited English proficient 9.9 9.7  0.949  
Percent special education 9.5 9.9  0.936  
      
B. Student performance measures      
Standardized score, math -0.293 0.000  <0.001 *** 
Standardized score, ELA -0.291 -0.019  <0.001 *** 
Scale score, math 653.4 664.3  0.001 *** 
Scale score, ELA 651.4 661.0  0.001 *** 
Percent Level 3 or 4 in math 43.9 58.4  <0.001 *** 
      
Lag standardized score, math -0.251 -0.039  <0.001 *** 
Lag standardized score, ELA -0.218 0.022  <0.001 *** 
Percent tested in both subjects 88.2 87.5  0.869  
Percent tested in math only 7.3 8.7  0.710  
Percent tested in ELA only 0.5 0.5  0.998  
Percent not tested 4.0 3.3  0.791  
Percent no lag score, math 61.9 66.4  0.493  
Percent no lag score, ELA 63.3 68.1  0.458  
Attendance rate 91.4 92.5  0.748  
Total per-pupil spending 16255 15334  0.045 ** 
 
Notes: elementary and middle school subsample, N=296 (68 APP and 228 comparison schools). p value is from a t-test 
for a difference in means. *** indicates statistically significant difference at the 0.01 level; ** indicates statistically 
significant difference at the 0.05 level; * indicates statistically significant difference at the 0.01 level.  
 
APP schools enrolled considerably fewer Asian and white students than comparison schools, 
and had a greater share of black and Hispanic students. Of these, only the differences in white and 
black enrollment shares are statistically significant, and the difference in the black share is sizable: 43 
percent in APP schools versus 31 percent in comparison schools. The latter two differences are 
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statistically significant. Likewise, a greater share of students at APP schools was eligible to receive 
free lunch (67 percent versus 60 percent in comparison schools), though this difference is not 
statistically significant.  Few differences were observed in the percent female, recent immigrant, 
native born, limited English proficient, and full-time special education.14 Virtually the same fraction 
of students was tested in mathematics and/or ELA in the two types of schools, indicating little 
difference in test exemptions, on average. Average per-student spending was also similar. 
Attendance rates were comparable (91.4 percent in APP schools, versus 92.5 percent in comparison 
schools). Appendix Figure 1 provides the complete distribution of percent black, Hispanic, and 
eligible for free lunch within each school group in the initial year.  
Lastly, the elementary/middle schools in which APP principals were located were somewhat 
smaller on average than those of comparison principals, although this difference is not statistically 
significant. Panel A of Table 4 shows that the average enrollment in elementary/middle schools was 
403 for APP schools (in the first year of the principal’s service) and 439 for comparison schools. 
The median school size was 282 and 343, respectively. Figure 5 illustrates the entire distribution of 
enrollment for the two groups of schools. Generally speaking, the distributions are quite similar, 
though APP principals were more likely to be placed in a school with fewer than 200 students 
enrolled. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 The percent receiving full-time special education in this case represents the percent of students in grades 3 to 8 in this 
category. Because many full-time special education students are not in graded classrooms, this understates the special 
education population in these schools. 
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Figure 5: Initial year distribution of school size, APP and comparison schools serving 
elementary/middle grades 
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Notes: elementary/middle school subsample, N=296 (68 APP and 228 comparison principals, in their first year as 
principal (2005 or 2006)). 
 
 
V. School Characteristics: High Schools Led by APP and Comparison 
Principals 
 
The distribution of APP and comparison high schools across boroughs differs from that of 
elementary and middle schools (compare Figure 6 and Figure 4). In contrast to the elementary and 
middle schools, new APP principals leading high schools were more likely to be located in 
Manhattan than new comparison principals (42.9% of APP versus 21.9% of comparison), while 
comparison principals were more likely to be leading schools in the Bronx (31.4%), Brooklyn 
(28.6%), and Queens (15.2%).  
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Figure 6: Distribution of APP and comparison high schools by borough 
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                         Notes: high school subsample, N=127 (22 APP and 105 comparison principals). 
 
Panel A of Table 5 summarizes the mean characteristics of high schools using data from the 
principal’s initial year of service. Because of the small number of schools in the APP group, only two 
of the differences observed here—school size and years of operation—are statistically significant at 
conventional levels. However, there are a number of differences in school characteristics worth 
noting. As was the case with the elementary and middle schools, APP schools had a larger share of 
black students (48.5 percent versus 40.4 percent) and significantly fewer Asian and white students. A 
larger share of APP school students were native born (81.2 percent versus 76.1 percent), and fewer 
were recent immigrants. Enrollment in APP high schools was also lower on average than in 
comparison high schools.   
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Table 5: Mean characteristics of APP and comparison high schools in the initial year 
 Means    
 APP Comparison  p  
A. School and student characteristics      
Enrollment 317.8 595.4  0.002 *** 
Years school has been in operation 7.4 4.4  0.006 ** 
Percent white enrollment 3.8 7.7  0.521  
Percent black enrollment 48.5 40.4  0.492  
Percent Hispanic enrollment 40.1 42.1  0.867  
Percent Asian/other enrollment 4.2 7.0  0.635  
Percent recent immigrants 7.0 8.3  0.844  
Percent native born 81.2 76.1  0.613  
Percent female 53.2 53.6  0.967  
Percent free lunch eligible 58.8 59.7  0.940  
Percent limited English proficient 7.6 8.8  0.861  
Percent special education 13.6 10.9  0.724  
      
B. Student performance measures      
Regents: percent passing English (55+) 79.1 89.0  0.211  
Regents: percent passing math (55+) 86.0 93.7  0.227  
Regents: percent passing global history (55+) 79.6 81.1  0.877  
Regents: percent passing biology (55+) 84.2 86.0  0.827  
      
Regents: percent taking English 23.8 21.3  0.802  
Regents: percent taking math 36.4 31.0  0.630  
Regents: percent taking global history 34.2 28.8  0.620  
Regents: percent taking biology 31.5 28.4  0.771  
      
Percent passing ten or more credits 28.7 32.6  0.725  
Attendance rate 72.3 73.3  0.929  
4-year graduation rate (where available) 55.3 44.8  0.288  
 
Notes: high school subsample, N=126 (21 APP and 105 comparison schools). The four-year graduation rate is only 
observed for 10 APP schools and 51 comparison schools). p value is from a t-test for a difference in means. *** indicates 
statistically significant difference at the 0.01 level. 
 
As shown in Panel A of Table 5, enrollment in APP high schools averaged 318 while 
enrollment in comparison schools averaged 595, a statistically significant difference. While the median 
school size was lower for comparison high schools (252 versus 286 in APP schools), comparison 
principals were more likely to be located in very large high schools. The largest school led by an APP 
principal enrolled 864 students, while 15 percent of comparison principals began work in a school of 
1,000 or more students.  
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Our sample of high schools included a large number of new schools. Panel A of Table 5 
indicates that APP principals led an older set of schools, on average, than comparison schools. This 
difference, however, is attributable mainly to the small sample of schools. Of the 21 APP principals, 
9 (or 43 percent) were leading new schools (a list of all APP high schools is provided in Appendix 
Table 6). A similar proportion of comparison principals (47 percent) had taken the helm of new 
schools. Because a greater share of APP principals led older schools, the APP average appears to be 
much higher than the comparison group. Again, due to the large number of new schools we are very 
limited in the kinds of ―pre‖ and ―post‖ comparisons that can be made for high schools.  
 
VI.   Average Achievement in APP and Comparison Schools 
Measures and definitions 
For elementary and middle schools, our primary student outcome measures are average test 
scores on the New York State exams in English Language Arts (ELA) and mathematics, 
administered in 3rd through 8th grade. At the high school level, our key school performance measures 
are passing rates on the Regents exams (Comprehensive English, Mathematics ―A,‖ Global History, 
and Biology), four-year cohort graduation rates, and annual rates of credit accumulation. 15 
Test performance on the ELA and mathematics tests can be expressed in three ways: scale 
scores, performance levels, and standardized scores. A student’s scale score is a re-scaled version of 
his/her number of correct test answers. This scale score ranges from (roughly) 470 to 800, and is 
intended to be comparable across grades.16 A school’s average scale score in a given subject is simply the 
average of its students’ scale scores on that subject’s test. 
                                                 
15 Four- year graduation rates are taken from the Annual School Report Cards. 
16 The New York State tests are not ―vertically scaled.‖ That is, the scale scores from these tests cannot be used to 
measure student progress from grade to grade on a continuum of learned skills. Rather, student progress can only be 
measured relative to proficiency in meeting the state standards. It is for this reason that New York does not provide 
averages of scale scores across grades. For more information, see the New York City Department of Education’s guide 
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Performance levels are discrete ranges of scale scores determined by state educational standards: 
Level 1 (Not Meeting Learning Standards), Level 2 (Partially Meeting Learning Standards), Level 3 
(Meeting Learning Standards) and Level 4 (Meeting Learning Standards with Distinction). Students 
scoring at Level 3 or Level 4 on a given subject exam are considered to be ―proficient‖ in that 
subject, or meeting state standards. A school’s proficiency rate in a given subject is the percent of 
students reaching Level 3 or 4 in that subject. 
Finally, a standardized score (also known as a ―z‖-score) indicates where a student’s scale score 
falls in the distribution of test scores. This score is calculated as the difference between a student’s 
scale score and the city average score, divided by the overall standard deviation in test scores.17 (This 
calculation is done with respect to the student’s own grade). Its interpretation is straightforward: a 
student’s standardized score tells us how far he/she scored from the city average test-taker in 
his/her grade, in standard deviation units. A standardized score of 1.5 indicates a student scored 1.5 
standard deviations above average. Similarly, a standardized score of -0.3 indicates a student who 
scored 0.3 standard deviations below average.18 A score at grade level average has a standardized 
score of zero. At the school level, the average standardized score in a given subject is simply the average 
of its students’ standardized scores on that test. 
Each of these three measures has advantages and shortcomings. Scale scores are an 
―absolute‖ measure of performance, but the citywide (and statewide) average fluctuates from year to 
year and is sensitive to test inflation or changes in test design. Cross-grade comparisons of scale 
scores may be problematic in practice, even if they are intended to be comparable. These problems 
                                                                                                                                                             
to the state tests here: http://schools.nyc.gov/Accountability/YearlyTesting/TestInformation/Tests/default.htm and 
the New York State Department of Education documentation here: http://www.emsc.nysed.gov/irts/ela-math/. For a 
readable explanation of these concepts used in this section, see Koretz (2008).     
17 The standard deviation is a measure of dispersion, or variation, in scores.  Loosely, it can be thought of as how far 
away from the mean the average student scored.  If all students receive the same score, the standard deviation is zero. 
18 When test scores are distributed normally, roughly 68 percent of students fall between 1 standard deviation below and 
1 standard deviation above the mean. Similarly, roughly 95 percent fall between 2 standard deviations below and 2 
standard deviations above the mean. 
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may stem from the lack of vertical scaling, or shifts over time in the grade composition of schools.19 
Proficiency rates are easy to understand ―absolute‖ measures of performance, and are the most 
commonly cited student achievement measure as the centerpiece of No Child Left Behind. They are 
also a critical component of the New York City School Progress Reports. On the other hand, they 
mask a great deal of information and frequently provide misleading comparisons of school 
performance.20  
While less transparent to the average reader, standardized scores address most of the 
shortcomings cited above. Their use is standard practice in educational research and evaluation, 
given their comparability across tests, across grades, and over time. We report mean scale scores and 
average proficiency rates for APP and comparison schools only in this section, and we rely strictly 
on standardized scores in our regression analysis in Sections VII – VIII. In addition to 
contemporaneous standardized scores, we also calculate for each school their students’ average 
standardized scores from the prior year.21 In other words, these lagged standardized scores represent 
the average achievement of a school’s currently enrolled students who were tested in the prior year.  
In the case of the Regents exams, we define passing as a score of 55 or higher, the minimum 
for a local diploma during this period. The minimum passing score for a Regents’ diploma is 65. 
Regents exam results were available for all years of our high school data series (2003-04 to 2007-08), 
while graduation rates were only available through 2006-07.22 Because many of the high schools in 
                                                 
19 A comparison of average scale scores for two schools at two points in time may make sense if the grade composition 
of these schools remains constant. But if one school increases its population of 6th graders (for example) relative to the 
other, and 6th grade scale scores are typically lower than other grades, then the former school will be ―penalized‖ for its 
growth in its 6th grade population. 
20 To illustrate, suppose two schools make equal improvements in their students’ scale scores. Assume the first school’s 
students were originally just below the Level 3 cut score and the second’s were much further below the cut score. Even 
if the two schools make identical progress, the first school’s proficiency rate is likely to rise much more than the second. 
This example can be extended to include a third school where many students are already above the Level 3 threshold, 
but still make the same progress in scale scores as the other two schools. In this case, the first school will appear to have 
significantly greater ―gains,‖ as measured by proficiency rates, than both the second and third school.  
21 Only students with scores observed in the prior year can be used in this calculation. Because 3rd grade is the first year 
of testing, none of the students in this grade have lagged scale scores. 
22 Four-year cohort graduation rates for 2007-08 were not available as of this writing. 
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our analysis were new in 2005 or 2006, many do not yet have four-year cohort graduation rates 
available. We do have a benchmark measure of credit accumulation, which indicates the percent of 
students in grades 9 – 12 who passed ten or more credits in a given academic year. 
The only other measure at both the elementary/middle and high school levels that might be 
considered an outcome is the average rate of student attendance. There tends to be little variation in 
attendance at the elementary/middle school levels (most of the elementary and middle schools in 
our study have attendance rates of 90 percent or higher). However, we do observe more variation at 
the high school level, where half of our school observations have attendance rates that fall between 
59 percent and 78 percent (with a mean of 62 percent). We do not use attendance rates as an 
outcome measure in this report, but plan to do so in future research. 
 
Initial year achievement in APP and comparison schools  
 A comparison of average mathematics and ELA achievement in APP and comparison 
schools reveals stark differences in APP and comparison schools before the arrival of their new 
principals.23 As shown in Panel B of Table 4, which presents the average achievement in APP and 
comparison schools in the principal’s initial year of service, students at APP schools performed 
substantially lower on the state ELA and mathematics tests, with students scoring an average of 0.29 
standard deviations below their grade-level mean.24 Students at comparison schools scored mostly at 
grade-level mean, on average. Appendix Figure 2 illustrates the complete distribution of school-level 
average standardized scores, by group, in the principals’ initial year. 
                                                 
23 As we noted in Section II, we refer to schools eventually lead by an APP principal as ―APP schools.‖ ―Comparison 
schools‖ are schools eventually lead by a comparison group principal. 
24 We use the principal’s initial year of service to describe the conditions of the school in the year the principal took the 
helm of that school. It is possible, of course, that a principal can have an immediate impact on their school in his or her 
first year. Many of the principals in our sample, however, took the leadership of a school in the middle of the academic 
year. For this reason, we assume here that the initial year impact is relatively modest. In our regression analysis we are 
able to relax this assumption and examine changes in the principal’s first year. 
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When comparing average lagged performance of students in ELA and mathematics—that is, 
the average performance of students enrolled in APP and comparison schools in the prior year—we 
observe an identical pattern (Panel B of Table 4). Students attending APP schools on average scored 
0.25 standard deviations below their grade level average in mathematics and ELA in the prior year. 
Students in comparison schools scored 0.02 to 0.04 of a standard deviation below their grade level 
average in the prior year. 
Figures 7 and 8 present these initial differences between APP and comparison schools 
another way: in terms of proficiency levels.  For example, in their principals’ first year 58.4 percent 
of comparison schools’ students were proficient in mathematics (level 3 or 4) compared with 43.9 
percent of APP school students. A similar gap is observed for proficiency in ELA.  APP schools 
also averaged a large fraction of low achieving students, with 22.2 percent performing at level 1 in 
mathematics. 
 Figure 7: Initial year performance levels in mathematics, APP and comparison schools 
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Notes: elementary and middle school subsample, N=296 (68 APP and 228 comparison principals). Scores reflect the 
average for the school in the principal’s first year of service (2005 or 2006). 
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Figure 8: Initial year performance levels in ELA, APP and comparison schools serving elementary 
and middle grades by start cohort 
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Notes: graph produced separately for 2005 and 2006 cohorts due to change in the ELA test between these years.  
 
Differences in initial student performance are also observed at the high school level, as seen 
in Panel B of Table 5. However, because of our small sample of APP schools, none of these 
differences are statistically significant. Of those who took the exam, 79 percent of APP high school 
students earned a passing grade on the English Regents exam versus 89 percent of comparison 
school students. This pattern was similar in mathematics, history, and biology. These differences 
appear to be partly driven by the fraction of students in these schools taking the Regents. Generally 
speaking, a larger share of students in APP schools took the Regents exams, relative to comparison 
schools. For example, 36 percent of students in APP schools took the Mathematics A Regents in the 
initial year, as compared with 31 percent in comparison schools. Four-year graduation rates were 
higher among APP schools, at 55.3 percent (versus comparison schools’ rate of 44.8 percent), 
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though this difference is not statistically significant. Finally, the fraction of high school students 
earning 10 or more credits in the principal’s initial year was lower among APP schools (28.7 percent) 
than comparison schools (32.6 percent). 
As emphasized above, all comparisons of high school achievement in this report should be 
made with caution because of the small sample of APP high schools. This is particularly problematic 
for the graduation rates, given only 10 APP and 51 comparison high schools had graduation data 
available. 
 
Achievement trends in APP and comparison schools 
All comparisons of student achievement made thus far reflect a single point in time—the 
principal’s initial year of service. An alternative view of student performance is provided in Figures 9 
- 12, which show average achievement in APP and comparison schools over time. These figures 
track average achievement in these schools both before and after the arrival of their new principal. It is 
important to emphasize that these figures represent simple averages that do not take into account 
differences in student characteristics or prior achievement. Our regression analyses in Sections VII 
and VIII do make such adjustments. Furthermore, in the cases where we use standardized scores, 
we re-emphasize that these measures represent relative achievement—that is, the average student’s 
test performance relative to the citywide grade-level average in a given year. 
 Figure 9 shows that average scale scores in APP and comparison schools were generally on 
an upward trend during this six-year period, as was the case citywide. The initial differences in APP 
and comparison schools are also evident here; in the years preceding the installation of a new 
principal, APP schools’ average scale scores were significantly below those of comparison schools. 
This difference was especially true for the 2005 cohort, in both subjects, and for the 2006 cohort in 
28          AUGUST 2009 
 
ELA. One should use appropriate caution when interpreting the time trend in ELA; because the test 
changed between 2005 and 2006, these average scores are not directly comparable.25  
Figure 9: Average scale scores in mathematics and ELA, constant cohorts of APP and comparison 
schools serving elementary and middle grades, 2003-2008 
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Notes: ―APP school‖ refers to a school in which an APP principal took over (in 2005 or 2006). ―Comparison school‖ 
(CP) refers to a school in which a comparison principal took over (in 2005 or 2006). Dotted lines indicate years in which 
the new principal was installed. The 2005 new principal cohort includes 27 APP schools and 90 comparison schools 
observed every year from 2003 to 2008. 2006 new principal cohort includes 19 APP and 95 comparison schools 
observed every year from 2004 to 2008. Note the ELA exam changed formats in 2006. 
 
In Figure 10, we compare trends in average standardized scores of APP and comparison 
elementary and middle schools.  We do this by first dividing these schools into four cohorts: (1) 
APP schools where a new principal was installed in 2005, (2) comparison schools with a new 
principal in 2005, (3) APP schools with a new principal in 2006, and (4) comparison schools with a 
new principal in 2006. For all four cohorts we observe average student achievement for two years 
prior to the arrival of the new principal. All schools included in these figures were observed 
                                                 
25Appendix Figure 3 provides trends in 4th grade ELA scores alone. The content and format of the test in this grade 
remained constant over this period. 
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continuously for the entire period, and represent a subset of sample schools.26 Dotted lines indicate 
years in which the new principals were installed. 
Figure 10: Average standardized scores in mathematics and ELA, constant cohorts of APP and 
comparison schools serving elementary and middle grades, 2003 – 2008 
APP (2005)
APP (2006)
CP (2006)
CP (2005)
New principal
-.
3
-.
2
-.
1
0
.1
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 s
ta
n
d
a
rd
iz
e
d
 s
c
o
re
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Year
Math
APP (2005)
APP (2006)
CP (2006)
CP (2005)
New principal
-.
3
-.
2
-.
1
0
.1
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 s
ta
n
d
a
rd
iz
e
d
 s
c
o
re
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Year
Reading
 
 
Notes: ―APP school‖ refers to a school in which an APP principal took over (in 2005 or 2006). ―Comparison school‖ 
(CP) refers to a school in which a comparison principal took over (in 2005 or 2006). Dotted lines indicate years in which 
the new principal was installed. The 2005 new principal cohort includes 27 APP schools and 90 comparison schools 
observed every year from 2003 to 2008. 2006 new principal cohort includes 19 APP and 95 comparison schools 
observed every year from 2004 to 2008. 
 
 
Figure 10 reveals that mathematics and ELA achievement in APP elementary and middle 
schools were on a downward trajectory prior to the arrival of the new APP principals. Further, this 
trajectory differed from that experienced by comparison schools prior to the arrival of their new 
principals. This trend is particularly true for schools led by the 2005 cohort of APP principals. For 
this cohort, the average standardized score in mathematics fell 40 percent, from -0.185 to -0.259 
                                                 
26To be included in Figure 10, a school must have been observed continuously from at least two years before the 
installation of a new principal through the 2007-08 school year. In other words, the set of schools included in each 
cohort is held constant throughout the entire period. This includes 27 and 19 APP schools and 90 and 95 comparison 
schools in the 2005 and 2006 cohorts, respectively. These schools represent 2/3 of all elementary and middle APP 
schools and 80 percent of all comparison schools. As Appendix Table 2 shows, the remaining schools did not have 
complete data over this entire period (for example, they may have been missing data for one year, or only had one year 
of results prior to the arrival of the new principal). 
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between 2003 and 2005, the years leading up to and including the APP principal’s initial year. 
Average standardized scores in ELA fell from -0.209 to -0.282 over the same period. By contrast, in 
comparison schools average mathematics achievement rose during these same three years and fell 
only slightly in ELA. In both ELA and mathematics, average achievement in the 2005 cohort of 
APP schools stabilized somewhat after the arrival of the new principal, but dipped again in 2008 (in 
relative terms; recall these are standardized scores). 
The initial downward trend in student performance on the state exams was less strong 
among the 2006 cohort of APP schools. In this case, average achievement in mathematics fell from -
0.047 to -0.096 between 2004 and 2006—the years leading up to and including the principal’s initial 
year—and in ELA from -0.055 to -0.114. (Scores in mathematics increased from 2004 to 2005, but 
fell again in 2006). Performance fell to a similar extent among the 2006 cohort of comparison 
schools in these years, in both subjects. At least in mathematics, the relative achievement of the 2006 
APP cohort continued to fall, but at a more modest rate than the years prior. 
Figure 11 provides an analogous view of achievement in APP and comparison high schools, 
measured using average passing rates on the Mathematics ―A‖ and English Regents exams (of those 
students who write the exam). Due to the very small number of school observations used here, these 
statistics and their interpretations should be taken with appropriate caution.27 Passing rates on the 
Regents exam scores during this period ranged from 79 to 93 percent (among those who took the 
test), but the trend from 2006 was unmistakably downward for schools in all four groups. APP 
schools generally had lower pass rates than comparison schools in almost all years, with some 
suggestive evidence that these schools converged over time (mainly due to a faster rate of decline 
among comparison schools).   
                                                 
27Again, in Figures 11-12 the set of schools included in each cohort is held constant throughout the entire period. This 
includes 12 and 9 APP schools and 65 and 39 comparison schools in the 2005 and 2006 cohorts, respectively. Note that 
the 2005 cohort used here does not include a pre-2005 observation (too little data was available prior to 2005 to make 
this restriction). The 2006 cohort includes one year of pre-2006 data. 
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Figure 11: Average pass rates in Mathematics and English Regents exams, constant cohorts of APP 
and comparison high schools, 2005 – 2008 
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Notes: 2005 new principal cohort includes 12 APP schools and 65 comparison schools observed every year from 2005 
to 2008 (note there are no “before new principal” observations in this case). 2006 new principal cohort includes 9 APP schools and 
39 comparison schools observed every year from 2005 to 2008 (the first year precedes the new principal). 
 
Figure 12 illustrates the trend in average four-year graduation rates for these same four 
cohorts of high schools, at least for the small number of schools for which we have this data. 
Graduation rates improved between 2005 and 2007 for most cohorts, with the exception of the 
2005 cohort of APP schools, in which graduation rates fell from 59.0 percent to 47.3 percent 
between 2006 and 2007, after rising from 2005 to 2006. Again, the number of schools used in these 
calculations is very small, especially for the APP cohorts. Consequently, the inferences we can draw 
from these comparisons are quite limited. 
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Figure 12: High school graduation rates, APP and comparison high schools, 2004 – 2007 
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Notes: 2005 new principal cohorts include 8 APP and 30 comparison principals in 2004 (the year prior to the new 
principal) and 12 APP and 65 comparison principals in 2005 – 2007. The 2006 new principal cohorts include 9 APP and 
39 principals in all years.  
 
 
 Finally, Figure 13 shows the trends in the school average rate of students earning ten or 
more credits in each year (a measure of ―satisfactory progress‖ toward graduation); the cohorts 
identical to those used in Figure 12. The fraction of students making satisfactory progress was on a 
general upward trend for all groups, rising from 26 – 31 percent in 2005 to 34 – 38 percent in 2006. 
The 2005 cohort of APP schools appears to have improved at the fastest rate, from an average of 
25.7 percent of students earning 10 or more credits in 2005—the principal’s first year—to 35.9 
percent in 2006. By comparison the 2005 cohort of comparison schools rose from an average of 
30.7 percent to 33.7 percent. Similarly, the 2006 cohort of APP schools improved from an average 
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of 28.2 percent of students making satisfactory progress to 36.8 percent. As before, the number of 
schools used in these calculations is very small. 
Figure 13: Credit accumulation, APP and comparison high schools, 2004 – 2007 
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Notes: 2005 new principal cohorts include 8 APP and 30 comparison principals in 2004 (the year prior to the new 
principal) and 12 APP and 65 comparison principals in 2005 – 2007. The 2006 new principal cohorts include 9 APP and 
39 principals in all years. 
 
Summary 
 In this section we provided a comparison of average student achievement in APP and 
comparison schools, both in the principals’ initial year and in years before and after the installation 
of a new principal. We found significant differences in the average achievement in mathematics and 
ELA at APP and comparison schools, with students at APP schools performing at lower levels—an 
achievement gap that preceded the arrival of the new principals. In the principals’ initial year, students 
in APP schools were already performing below their citywide grade level average, while students in 
comparison schools performed roughly at their grade level average. At the high school level, 
students at APP schools who took the Regents exams performed somewhat lower on these tests 
than students at comparison schools (though this sample is small).  
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 An important difference between APP schools and comparison schools was revealed in 
Figure 10. Schools where an APP principal was placed were generally on a sharp downward trend in 
mathematics and ELA in the years preceding the new principal. This was especially evident for the 
2005 cohort of APP schools. Comparison schools, by contrast, experienced relatively stable 
performance in these subjects prior to their new principal.   
 We emphasize that the results presented in this section are only simple comparisons of 
group averages. As is true for all analyses of school-level performance, there is likely to be a myriad 
of other factors not accounted for here that partly explain observed differences in test scores. These 
factors include student composition such as poverty (which varies both between schools and within 
schools over time) and prior achievement. Our regression analyses in the following sections 
explicitly attempt to account for these differences.  
 
VII. Regression Analysis: Elementary and Middle Schools 
Overview of the analytical approach 
As shown in Section IV - VI, the first two cohorts of APP principals were placed in schools 
that were demographically, geographically, and academically distinct from comparison schools led by 
other new principals. Elementary and middle school APP principals were almost twice as likely to be 
located in the Bronx, and the average student attending these schools was significantly more likely to 
be black and slightly more likely to be poor. Most importantly, elementary and middle school APP 
principals were disproportionately placed in schools that were already lower achieving, on average, 
than their peer schools led by other new principals. Average achievement in APP schools was largely 
on a downward trend, relative to the city average, prior to the arrival of the APP principals.  
In this section, we provide a more formal comparison of outcomes in elementary and middle 
schools led by APP and comparison principals. This analysis involves estimating a series of multiple 
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regression models that attempt to compare performance in APP and comparison schools after 
controlling for observable differences between these groups of schools (including prior year 
performance of students in those schools). 
Here we rely strictly on average standardized scores as our measure of ELA and mathematics 
achievement. As explained in Section VI, these measures are the most reliable for making 
comparisons between schools, across grades, and over time. The reader should keep in mind that 
these are measures of relative performance; they indicate how the average student in a school 
performed relative to his/her citywide grade level average. These scores are in standard deviation 
units—a measure of the overall grade-level variation in scores. A standardized score of 1, for 
example, indicates that the average student scored one standard deviation above their grade level 
average. All of the standardized scores used here are school-level averages.28 
As described in the Methodological Appendix, we begin by estimating a simple ―difference-
in-difference‖ regression model that compares APP school outcomes before and after the arrival of 
their APP principal with comparison school outcomes before and after the arrival of their new 
principal. This approach allows achievement in APP and comparison schools to differ in the years 
before the new principal (which we know from Section VI to be true) as well as after. We can then 
test whether APP schools experienced greater improvements in average achievement after the 
installation of new leadership than similar comparison schools.29 
 We then extend this model by estimating a difference-in-difference regression model with 
school-level ―fixed effects.‖ Because we observe most APP and comparison schools before and 
after the arrival of a new principal, we can effectively allow each school to have its own baseline 
                                                 
28 Across all schools in our sample, the standard deviation of these school-level average scores is approximately 0.48 in 
math and 0.45 in ELA. 
29 Our model does not make use of student-level achievement gains. Rather, we are comparing average school scores in a 
given year conditional on the average score of students in that school, in the prior year. Further, these average scores are 
standardized, meaning they are all interpreted relative to the citywide average. 
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level of achievement. In this case, changes in outcomes within schools over time provide our estimate of 
APP effects. While this is our preferred model, it relies on having a sufficient number of schools 
observed both before and after the arrival of a new principal.  
In all cases, our regression model controls for the average prior year test scores for the 
students in each school.30 We also provide regression estimates that alternately include and exclude 
other school-level controls, such as the student racial and gender composition, percent eligible for 
free lunch, percent native born or immigrant, and the like. Our findings are largely unaffected by the 
inclusion of these controls. We have also estimated all models without controlling for prior year test 
scores, and with and without controls for the percent of students not tested; again, the results are 
quite similar. 
As a final extension, we re-estimate all of the above models under an alternative specification 
where APP and comparison schools are allowed to have different pre- and post-new principal trends. 
In these models, ―one year before new principal‖ represents the baseline one reference year, while 
―two or more years before new principal,‖ ―first year under new principal,‖ ―second year under new 
principal,‖ and ―third or later year under new principal‖ are differences in average achievement 
relative to the baseline year. This approach allows us to examine whether these two types of schools 
followed different trajectories prior to the new principal (as was suggested in Figure 10), as well as 
whether these schools followed different trajectories after the new principal took the helm. As we 
discuss below, this alternative model proves to be informative. 
 
Results 
Table 6 presents results from our basic difference-in-difference regression model for 
elementary and middle school ELA and mathematics. Columns (1) – (4) provide coefficient 
                                                 
30 Controlling for prior year achievement is similar in spirit to more refined ―value-added‖ models. Bear in mind that our 
measures of contemporaneous and lagged achievement are generated from individual student-level data. 
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estimates from a model with no additional school controls beyond lagged student achievement and 
school level (PK6, PK9, MS, MS/HS) while columns (5) – (8) present estimates from models with a 
full set of controls.31 The models represented in columns (3) – (4) and (7) – (8) include school fixed 
effects. 
Table 6: Regression results for standardized mathematics and ELA scores, elementary and middle 
schools 
 
 Basic Model  Model with Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Math ELA Math ELA  Math ELA Math ELA 
          
Prior year  0.905*** 0.895*** 0.410*** 0.370***  0.739*** 0.706*** 0.367*** 0.323*** 
standardized score (0.035) (0.035) (0.055) (0.051)  (0.075) (0.071) (0.056) (0.047) 
          
APP school (before new  -0.018 -0.056**    -0.013 -0.054**   
principal) (0.019) (0.020)    (0.018) (0.020)   
          
Post new principal 0.018 -0.022* -0.016 -0.041***  -0.008 -0.043*** -0.028** -0.034*** 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007)  (0.017) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) 
          
 APP * post new  -0.049** 0.014 -0.040* 0.016  -0.042* 0.012 -0.033 0.019 
principal (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.015)  (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) 
          
School fixed effects NO NO YES YES  NO NO YES YES 
          
Constant 0.001 -0.031** -0.007 -0.008  0.057 0.092 0.199 0.413** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005)  (0.058) (0.053) (0.159) (0.147) 
          
N 1625 1623 1625 1623  1599 1597 1599 1597 
 
Notes: see Appendix Table 3 for the full set of coefficient estimates. Regressions in columns (5) – (8) control for average 
student characteristics and per-pupil spending; columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) control for school level; (5) and (6) 
additionally control for borough effects. In columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) standard errors allow for clustering by school. 
Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) are estimates from fixed effects models with robust standard errors in parentheses. * 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.   
 
Controlling for lagged achievement, we find that APP schools on average had lower pre-
existing levels of achievement relative to comparison schools. This comports with our finding in 
Figures 9-10 that showed APP schools were initially lower performing. In Table 6, this difference is 
visible in the ―APP school (before new principal)‖ coefficient, which represents the initial gap 
between APP and comparison schools (comparison schools are the omitted reference group). This 
initial difference is statistically significant in mathematics, at 0.056 standard deviations. A smaller and 
                                                 
31 For readability we do not include coefficient estimates for the additional control variables in Table 6. The full table of 
estimates can be found in Appendix Table 3.  
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statistically insignificant difference of 0.018 is observed in ELA. These estimates are virtually the 
same when including a full set of school controls (columns (5) – (8)).  
 Interestingly, relative student test performance falls modestly in the years following the 
installation of a new principal, in both APP and comparison schools. This finding may represent a 
―transition‖ effect for new principals, not unlike those observed for novice teachers, who are found 
to be less effective than their peers in their first few years of teaching.32 In Table 6, this difference is 
seen in the ―post new principal‖ coefficient, which applies to both school types. We find that 
average standardized scores in ELA are lower by 0.022 to 0.043 standard deviations after the arrival 
of a new principal (a statistically significant difference). Scores in mathematics are as much as 0.028 
standard deviations lower. This finding is robust to the inclusion of school fixed effects; in our full 
model with controls and fixed effects, we find a statistically significant negative relationship between 
new principals and achievement in both mathematics and ELA.  
The important question for this study is whether APP schools—after controlling for prior 
student achievement and pre-existing differences in school performance—perform differently from 
comparison schools following the installation of a new principal. In Table 6, this relationship is 
captured in the ―APP * post new principal‖ interaction coefficient, which represents the difference in 
the ―post new principal‖ effect between APP and comparison schools. 
Here we find that in ELA average standardized scores in APP schools were marginally 
higher after the installation of the new principal, relative to comparison schools after the installation 
of a new principal. However, these estimates—which range from 0.012 to 0.019 standard 
deviations—are not statistically significant. Relative to the overall standard deviation across schools 
in average scores (about 0.45 to 0.48), all of these differences are also quite small. In mathematics, 
APP schools performed relatively worse than comparison schools in the years following the new 
                                                 
32 See for example Boyd et al. (2008). 
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principal. Our estimate of the difference in the ―post new principal‖ effect in mathematics ranges 
from -0.033 to -0.049 standard deviations. While this estimate is statistically significant in our models 
without controls, the estimate slips below statistical significance in our full model with controls 
(column (7)).  
The results shown in Table 6 effectively consider two periods for these groups of schools: 
before the arrival of their new principal, and after. In Table 7, we estimate a more flexible model 
that allows for differential pre-and post- trends in school achievement. The structure of this table is 
identical to that of Table 6: columns (1) – (4) omit additional school level controls while (5) – (8) 
include them. Columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) represent models with fixed effects. All regressions 
control for lagged student achievement. As described above, ―one year before new principal‖ is the 
baseline period for this analysis. ―Two or more years before new principal,‖ ―first year new 
principal,‖ ―second year under new principal,‖ and ―third or later year under new principal‖ are all 
differences with respect to the baseline year. (The coefficient ―APP school (one year before new principal)‖ 
contrasts APP schools with comparison schools in the baseline year, i.e. the year before the new 
principal). This model is also useful in that it allows us to see how average achievement changes with 
the accumulated experience of new principals.
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Table 7: Regression results for standardized mathematics and ELA scores, elementary and middle schools – pre and post trajectory model 
 
 Basic Model  Model with Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Math ELA Math ELA  Math ELA Math ELA 
          
Prior year standardized score 0.906*** 0.896*** 0.412*** 0.376***  0.733*** 0.703*** 0.366*** 0.323*** 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.055) (0.053)  (0.076) (0.073) (0.055) (0.047) 
          
APP school (one year before new principal) -0.026 -0.092*** -- --  -0.019 -0.087*** -- -- 
 (0.028) (0.029)    (0.026) (0.027)   
          
2
nd
 or more years before new principal 0.004 -0.002 0.013 0.014  0.000 -0.003 0.008 0.007 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012)  (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) 
          
   APP * 2
nd
 or more years before new principal 0.016 0.065* -0.008 0.060*  0.010 0.058* -0.002 0.058* 
 (0.033) (0.029) (0.031) (0.025)  (0.032) (0.025) (0.030) (0.024) 
          
1
st
 year new principal 0.029 -0.054*** 0.006 -0.048***  0.017 -0.042** -0.008 -0.038** 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012)  (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) 
          
   APP * 1
st
 year new principal -0.067 0.048 -0.056 0.047  -0.056 0.040 -0.045 0.049 
 (0.040) (0.034) (0.034) (0.027)  (0.039) (0.032) (0.034) (0.025) 
          
2
nd
 year new principal 0.036* -0.010 -0.001 -0.022  -0.009 -0.030 -0.035* -0.012 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012)  (0.022) (0.018) (0.015) (0.013) 
          
   APP * 2
nd
 year new principal -0.021 0.031 -0.033 0.035  -0.019 0.030 -0.025 0.041 
 (0.034) (0.027) (0.031) (0.024)  (0.032) (0.025) (0.030) (0.023) 
          
3
rd
 or later year new principal 0.004 -0.011 -0.025* -0.030*  -0.056 -0.063* -0.062*** -0.031* 
 (0.013) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012)  (0.031) (0.028) (0.017) (0.014) 
          
   APP * 3
rd
 or later year new principal -0.035 0.065* -0.043 0.057**  -0.034 0.057* -0.032 0.059** 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.022)  (0.026) (0.023) (0.027) (0.020) 
          
School fixed effects NO NO YES YES  NO NO YES YES 
          
Constant -0.001 -0.029 -0.013 -0.023**  0.080 0.096 0.195 0.394** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.010) (0.008)  (0.065) (0.062) (0.162) (0.146) 
          
N 1625 1623 1625 1623  1599 1597 1599 1597 
Notes: see Appendix Table 3 for the full set of coefficient estimates from the model with controls. Regressions in columns (5) – (8) control for average student 
characteristics and per-pupil spending; columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) control for school level; (5) and (6) additionally control for borough effects. In columns (1), (2), (5), 
and (6) standard errors allow for clustering by school. Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) are estimates from fixed effects models with robust standard errors in parentheses. * 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  In all columns, one year before new principal is the omitted category. 
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With respect to mathematics achievement, the results in Table 7 roughly mirror those in 
Table 6. APP principals’ schools perform marginally worse in mathematics during their first years on 
the job, relative to comparison schools, although these differences are statistically insignificant. This 
gap is visible in the ―APP * 1st year new principal‖ coefficient. Importantly, this gap in the principal’s 
first year is typically about twice as large as that estimated for later years (such as the ―APP * 2nd year 
new principal‖ coefficient). This may suggest that mathematics performance in APP schools, 
relatively speaking, take an initial downturn in mathematics, relative to comparison schools, but then 
begin to rebound. However, none of these estimates are statistically significant. 
Our findings for ELA are a bit more interesting and complex. Our descriptive look at trends 
in mean achievement presented in Section VI found that achievement in APP schools—particularly 
in ELA—was on a downward trajectory prior to their new principals’ hiring. This pattern is visible 
here as well. In Table 7 we see that ELA performance two or more years before the new principal was 
higher than one year before (see the coefficient on ―APP * 2nd or more years before new principal,‖ 
which represents average achievement relative to the baseline year, one year before the new 
principal). In their first year as principal, comparison principals witnessed an average decline in 
standardized ELA scores. However, APP schools appear to have made offsetting improvements in 
ELA in their first year, relative to comparison schools. That is, APP schools did not experience the 
same ―first year penalty‖ in ELA that the comparison schools did. In their second year, APP schools 
held steady, relative to comparison schools who had not yet recovered from their ―first year 
penalty.‖ Notably, by their third year, APP schools had risen to a level comparable to the baseline 
year while comparison schools continued to decline. These differences are statistically significant in 
the principals’ third (and later) year. 
 Taken together, the pattern of ELA results in Table 7 are easily reconciled with those in 
Table 6 which provided a more crude ―before and after‖ comparison. There we found that new 
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APP principals’ schools may have performed marginally better in ELA than comparison schools, 
but the differences were statistically insignificant. Table 7 illustrates why. In APP schools, the 
preceding years were characterized by ELA scores on a sharp downward trajectory. Scores modestly 
rebounded in the years following—relative to comparison principals—such that a ―before and after‖ 
comparison shows only minor differences. 
Figure 14 provides a visual summary of the ELA coefficients found in column (6) of Table 7 
(the model with controls).33 The points on these line graphs represent average school achievement in 
APP and comparison schools after accounting for observable differences in schools via regression. Average ELA 
achievement in APP schools fell below that of comparison schools in the years leading up to the 
new principal. Further, in the year just prior to the installation of the new principal, achievement in 
APP schools fell relative to that in comparison schools (which remained relatively constant). Then, 
while achievement fell in the first year of the comparison principals’ tenure, achievement in APP 
schools remained stable. In the second and third years, APP schools held steady while standardized 
scores continued to fall in comparison schools. 
 
 
                                                 
33 We do not provide this figure for math, as most of the coefficients in that model are statistically insignificant.  
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Figure 14: Time pattern of ELA coefficients from Table 7 column (6) 
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As described in the Methodological Appendix, we have also estimated a school-by-grade 
regression model, where each grade within a school is considered individually (with some accounting 
for common factors at the school level). While we do not have a theory for why new principals 
would have differing effects by grade, this model does improve somewhat on those presented in 
Tables 6-7 by making grade-specific comparisons. The results of this regression model can be found 
in Appendix Tables 5A and 5B. We find few differences using this approach. 
 
VIII. Regression Analysis: High Schools 
In this section we use a similar approach to that taken in Section VII to formally compare 
outcomes in high schools led by APP and comparison principals. As stated before, because of the 
very small sample of APP high schools we are limited in our ability to learn much from a multiple 
regression analysis of these schools. In addition, because there are a large number of new high 
schools represented here (see Appendix Table 6), we are further constrained in our ability to make 
―before‖ and ―after‖ comparisons of APP and comparison high schools. 
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With these limitations in mind, we begin by estimating a simple difference-in-difference 
model for Regents exam pass rates, similar to that in Table 6. We consider four Regents exams as 
our measures of high school student achievement: English, mathematics, biology, and global history. 
Passing is defined as a score of 55 and higher—the minimum requirement for a local diploma during 
this period—and a school’s passing rate is defined as the fraction of students who write the test that 
pass with a score of 55 or higher. For high school students, we do not have a measure of lagged 
achievement as we did with elementary and middle school students. We do, however, control in our 
regressions for the same school characteristics used in Section VII (student race, free lunch 
eligibility, and the like). Because passing rates are influenced by the fraction of students who actually 
write the test in a given year, we also control for the percent of all students taking each exam. 
Columns (1) – (4) of Table 8 represent the simple difference-in-difference regression model, 
while columns (5) – (8) represent the same model with district fixed effects (refer again to Section 
VII for an explanation of these models). As before, only those schools with observed student outcomes before 
and after a new principal contribute to the ―APP * post new principal‖ estimate. Because there are 
many new schools among APP high schools, this constitutes only a small number of schools. 
We find in Table 8 that—controlling for other school characteristics—APP schools 
performed as well, if not slightly better than comparison schools in the years leading up to the new 
principal transition. In global history, APP schools appear to have performed much better in these 
earlier years (9.6 percentage points, a statistically significant difference). This is visible in the ―APP 
school (before new principal)‖ coefficient in Table 8. As was the case with elementary and middle 
schools, the first year with a new principal appears to have a small negative effect on student 
achievement in both APP and comparison schools, although English is the only subject for which 
this effect is statistically significant. (This is read from the ―post new principal‖ coefficient in Table 
8).  
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Table 8: Regression results for high school Regents exam pass rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Math 
Regents 
English 
Regents 
Biology 
Regents 
History 
Regents 
Math 
Regents 
English 
Regents 
Biology 
Regents 
History 
Regents 
         
Percent taking 0.036 0.058 0.057 0.022 -0.020 0.022 0.000 -0.023 
 (0.023) (0.030) (0.033) (0.028) (0.022) (0.029) (0.023) (0.028) 
         
APP school 0.047 0.024 0.043 0.096**     
 (0.026) (0.024) (0.046) (0.034)     
         
Post new principal -0.019 -0.082*** -0.031 -0.040 -0.007 -0.071** -0.031 -0.039 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.040) (0.028) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.029) 
         
   APP * post new principal -0.089** -0.046 -0.057 -0.100** -0.072* -0.048 -0.030 -0.095* 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.044) (0.033) (0.034) (0.037) (0.036) (0.042) 
         
Percent black -0.049 -0.129 -0.159* -0.032 -0.503 -0.297 -0.198 -0.523 
 (0.079) (0.087) (0.070) (0.103) (0.339) (0.363) (0.351) (0.414) 
         
Percent Hispanic -0.021 -0.066 -0.095 -0.003 -0.865* -0.511 -0.380 -0.414 
 (0.082) (0.084) (0.078) (0.107) (0.354) (0.380) (0.368) (0.433) 
         
Percent Asian or other 0.194 0.170 0.433* 0.588** 0.870* 0.737 0.145 1.120* 
 (0.127) (0.169) (0.215) (0.200) (0.411) (0.442) (0.423) (0.502) 
         
Percent recent immigrant 0.315** 0.281* 0.390** 0.411* 0.123 0.164 0.250 0.200 
 (0.113) (0.123) (0.145) (0.158) (0.254) (0.271) (0.260) (0.309) 
         
Percent female 0.063 0.160* 0.119 0.193 0.386 -0.030 -0.012 0.385 
 (0.048) (0.067) (0.088) (0.105) (0.210) (0.227) (0.217) (0.256) 
         
Percent eligible for free lunch 0.027 0.037 0.020 -0.002 0.036 0.022 0.029 0.005 
 (0.032) (0.029) (0.033) (0.044) (0.037) (0.039) (0.038) (0.045) 
         
Percent LEP -0.357*** -0.475*** -0.588*** -0.581*** -0.090 -0.281 -0.313 -0.257 
 (0.094) (0.115) (0.152) (0.152) (0.180) (0.191) (0.182) (0.218) 
         
Percent special education 0.025 -0.071 -0.033 0.002 0.218** 0.042 0.142* 0.235** 
 (0.050) (0.057) (0.056) (0.064) (0.067) (0.071) (0.066) (0.083) 
         
Constant 0.876*** 0.912*** 0.885*** 0.705*** 1.194*** 1.230*** 1.104*** 0.938* 
 (0.081) (0.100) (0.082) (0.117) (0.319) (0.342) (0.330) (0.388) 
         
N 538 537 538 538 538 537 538 538 
Notes: clustered standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Due to the small number of observations, these models do not include borough 
effects (although models that do include borough effects are similar).  
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As before, the important question for this study is whether APP high schools—after 
controlling for other pre-existing differences in schools—perform differently from comparison 
schools following the installation of a new principal. In Table 8, this relationship is captured in the 
―APP * post new principal‖ interaction coefficient, which represents the difference in the ―post new 
principal‖ effect between APP and comparison schools. We find that this differential is negative in 
all subjects, and statistically significant in both mathematics and history. This suggests that APP high 
schools may have performed relatively worse after the arrival of a new principal than similar 
comparison schools with new principals. However, as emphasized before, these estimates are 
generated from a very small number of schools for which data is available both before and after the 
new principal. In addition, we do not have a satisfactory measure of prior student achievement 
differences to rule out pre-existing differences academic achievement. As such, we cannot say with 
much confidence that these observed differences are attributable to school leadership. 
 Finally, in Table 9 we present results from a cross-sectional regression model that compares 
APP and comparison schools only in the ―post new principal‖ years. In these models, we avoid the 
problem encountered in Table 8 from the large number of new schools. On the other hand, we 
introduce a potentially more serious problem of having no ―before‖ observations to account for pre-
existing differences in academic achievement. (Thus, these models make an even weaker case for a 
causal relationship between school leadership and outcomes). In this case, we continue to find a 
negative and statistically significant difference between APP and comparison schools on the 
Mathematics A Regents. APP schools also fell below comparison schools on the other three Regents 
exams, though these differences are statistically insignificant.
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Table 9: Regression results for high school Regents exam pass rates – cross-sectional model with “post 
new principal” years only 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Math English Biology History 
     
Percent taking 0.210** 0.063 0.124 0.111 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.078) (0.065) 
     
APP school (post years only) -0.042** -0.020 -0.013 -0.007 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.022) (0.023) 
     
Percent black -0.040 -0.108 -0.123 0.067 
 (0.073) (0.101) (0.084) (0.114) 
     
Percent Hispanic 0.017 -0.064 -0.039 0.070 
 (0.074) (0.098) (0.087) (0.117) 
     
Percent Asian or other 0.095 0.180 0.458* 0.618** 
 (0.131) (0.195) (0.226) (0.205) 
     
Percent recent immigrant 0.124 0.106 0.186 0.037 
 (0.104) (0.142) (0.225) (0.224) 
     
Percent female 0.045 0.148* 0.106 0.151 
 (0.047) (0.070) (0.088) (0.108) 
     
Percent free lunch -0.039 0.004 -0.023 -0.060 
 (0.035) (0.044) (0.041) (0.056) 
     
Percent limited English proficient -0.196* -0.368** -0.448** -0.321 
 (0.086) (0.126) (0.160) (0.176) 
     
Perfect full-time special education -0.165 -0.343** -0.213 -0.330** 
 (0.087) (0.111) (0.109) (0.120) 
     
Year effects YES YES YES YES 
     
Constant 0.755*** 0.906*** 0.782*** 0.569*** 
 (0.095) (0.133) (0.110) (0.142) 
     
N 455 454 455 455 
 
                 Notes: clustered standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
IX. Conclusion 
The results of this analysis are encouraging, indicating that the NYC Leadership Academy 
has succeeded in bringing new principals to some of NYC's most challenging schools and curtailing 
their downward trends in performance, relative to the city. Although APP principals take charge of 
schools that had fallen behind other city schools, performance on standardized tests appear to have 
stabilized under their leadership and schools that had been falling relative to city-wide performance 
began to improve apace with city-wide growth. Further, there is some evidence that even more 
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improvement lies ahead. These results suggest the need for continued monitoring and follow-up 
study to understand whether—and to what extent—improvements in test scores persist and to 
identify the kinds of schools or conditions under which Aspiring Principal Program graduates are 
particularly successful (or unsuccessful). For the purpose of longitudinal analysis, this study was only 
able to focus on two cohorts of principals and aggregate school-level data, and examined 
performance over a relatively short period of time. Follow-up work using student-level data would 
allow us to understand the impact of Leadership Academy principals more fully and determine 
whether there are groups of students—such as initially low performing students—that are served 
particularly well. 
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Methodological Appendix 
 
In the following appendix, we outline our empirical approach to comparing academic outcomes in 
APP and comparison schools.  
 
Empirical model 
 
A contemporaneous comparison of APP and comparison schools (indexed with i) might be drawn 
by estimating the following regression model, for some school outcome variable Y (such as average 
mathematics performance): 
 
(1) ititititit XAPPXAPPYE 10],|[  
 
This model assumes that average school outcomes in year t (E[Yit]) can be expressed as a linear 
function of student and school characteristics Xit (such as school poverty and the percent of 
students classified as ELLs) and an indicator of APP principal leadership APPit (which equals one if 
school i is led by an APP principal). If after controlling for observed student and school 
characteristics APP-led schools have superior outcomes, then β1 should be positive. 
 
A contemporaneous comparison falls far short of an ideal test for differences in school leadership, 
however. In most cases, the vector of observed school characteristics Xit is unlikely to completely 
capture the myriad of ways in which APP and comparison schools differ with respect to outcomes. 
APP principals are new to their leadership roles, and are often placed in high-need schools with 
leadership vacancies. These vacancies may be indicative of poor past school performance or a 
generally challenging work environment. As a result, APP and comparison schools will typically 
differ in both observable and unobservable ways, even prior to their principals’ arrival. 
 
While this empirical challenge cannot be fully overcome here, we address the weaknesses of model 
(1) in several ways. First, we limit our analysis to schools led by principals with comparable tenure to 
our APP principals. In doing so, we avoid comparing schools led by APP principals to schools with 
experienced leadership that are likely to be more stable environments. Second, in most models we 
control for the past outcomes of students attending school i in year t: 
 
(2) ititititititit XYAPPYXAPPYE 1101],,|[  
 
This model tests whether, after controlling for observed school characteristics Xit and students past 
performance Yit-1, APP-led schools have better outcomes than non-APP-led schools. (Yit-1 represents 
the average outcomes of students attending school i in year t regardless of whether or not they 
attended i in year t-1). Third, we implement a difference-in-difference approach that compares APP 
school outcomes before and after the arrival of their APP principal to comparison school outcomes 
before and after the arrival of their new principal. Here, Postt is a variable that equals one in the years 
following the placement of a new principal, and APPi is an indicator of whether school i was 
eventually led by an APP principal: 
 
(3) ititittiitittiit XYAPPPostPostAPPYXPostAPPYE 132101 *],,,|[  
 
THE NEW YORK CITY ASPIRING PRINCIPALS PROGRAM 51 
 
This is the empirical model estimated in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) of Tables 6 and 7. This 
approach improves on models (1) and (2) by controlling for pre-existing outcomes in APP schools, 
allowing us to test whether APP schools experienced greater improvements after the installation of 
new leadership than similar comparison schools (this difference is captured by the coefficient β3). 
Finally, we estimate model (3) with the addition of school fixed effects.34 In this case, each school 
effectively has its own baseline level of achievement, and changes in outcomes within schools over 
time provide our estimate of the effect of APP leadership. 
 
From an internal validity standpoint, the difference-in-difference model with school fixed effects is 
our preferred model. However, estimation of this model (as well as model (3)) relies on having 
observed outcomes for schools both before and after the arrival of a new principal. As seen in 
Appendix Table 1, there are many cases where school observations are not available prior to the new 
principal’s arrival. This is especially true at the high school level, where new principals were more 
likely to be placed in a newly opened school with no prior history. 
 
The usual assumption in econometric models is that the error term is identically and independently 
distributed. In models (1) – (3), however, we have repeated observations on schools over multiple 
years. Thus there is good reason to believe that the error term—representing explanatory factors not 
captured in the regressors—are correlated within schools over time. Because of this, we assume 
―clustered‖ errors within each school group i. This assumption presumes zero correlation across 
groups (schools) but leaves the correlation within groups unspecified. In model (3) with school fixed 
effects, we instead use Huber-White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. 
 
As an alternative model, we also estimate a school-by-grade regression model, where each grade 
within a school is considered individually. That is, each data point used in the regression is a school 
(i) * grade (j) combination:  
 
(4)  jijtijtittiijtijttiijt XYAPPPostPostAPPYXPostAPPYE 132101 *],,,|[  
 
While we do not have a theory for why new principals would have differing effects by grade, this 
model does improve somewhat on (3) by making grade-specific comparisons. The outcomes (Y) of 
students in grade j are better matched with those students past performance and observable 
characteristics (X). School-by-grade models also allow us to include a grade-specific fixed effect κj 
that accounts for differential initial levels of achievement by grade. Finally, model (4) allows for 
further interaction between Post, APP, and grade j. Estimates of model (4) are provided in Appendix 
Tables 5A (with interaction effects) and 5B (without interaction effects). 
 
Internal validity 
 
Ideally, one would assess the relative effectiveness of APP-prepared principals by randomly 
assigning APP and other new, non-APP principals to schools, and then testing for differences in 
outcomes at a later date. Unfortunately for purposes of evaluation, principals are never assigned in 
this way.  
 
                                                 
34 In practice this implies the use of a set of dummy variables for each individual school.  
52          AUGUST 2009 
 
On the contrary, APP and comparison principals were assigned to schools in ways that were 
anything but random. Many non-APP principals, for example, rose to the rank of principal in a 
school where they had taught for many years. APP principals, on the other hand, were often 
purposefully placed in high-need schools where a vacancy existed. (Such vacancies, of course, are 
also non-random). This targeting is explicitly part of the mission of the NYC Leadership Academy. 
As a result, APP and comparison schools differed substantially on observable and unobservable 
dimensions well before these principals assumed leadership. 
 
Due to this non-random assignment process, our research design necessarily lacks the internal 
validity of a randomized controlled experiment. While we make every attempt in our analysis to 
account for systematic, pre-existing differences between schools, we can never be fully certain that 
observed difference in outcomes between APP and comparison schools are solely attributable to 
differences in leadership training.  
 
External validity 
 
We also emphasize that principals who enroll in (and complete) the Aspiring Principals Program are 
not a random sample of potential New York City principals. Candidates choose to apply, and the 
NYC Leadership Academy selects those they believe will be most successful in a school leadership 
position. In this setting, random assignment of principals to schools could tell us something about 
the overall effectiveness of Leadership Academy selected and trained candidates. But even under 
random assignment, we would not be able to provide a clear picture of the effectiveness of APP 
training for the average principal candidate. 
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Appendix Figure 1: Initial year distribution of average student characteristics, APP and comparison 
schools serving elementary and middle grades 
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Notes: elementary and middle school subsample, N=296 (68 APP and 228 comparison principals, in their first year as 
principal (2005 or 2006)). 
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Appendix Figure 2: Initial year distribution of average mathematics and ELA achievement, APP and 
comparison schools serving elementary and middle grades 
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Notes: elementary and middle school subsample, N=296 (68 APP and 228 comparison principals). Scores reflect the 
average for the school in the principal’s first year. 
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Appendix Figure 3: Average grade 4 scale scores in mathematics and ELA, constant cohorts of APP 
and comparison schools, 2003 - 2008 
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Notes: see notes to Figure 10. 
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Appendix Table 1: Mean characteristics of APP and comparison principals in 2007-08, split 
elementary/middle and high school samples 
 
 Elementary/middle   High school  
 Mean    Mean   
 APP Comparison p   APP Comparison p  
Percent male 27.9 22.4 0.012 **  52.4 47.6 0.690  
Percent white 48.5 50.4 0.564   38.1 47.6 0.424  
Percent black 38.2 29.4 0.002 **  42.9 31.4 0.311  
Percent Hispanic 11.8 17.1 0.018 *  14.3 15.2 0.911  
Percent Asian 1.5 1.8 0.969   0.0 3.8 0.363  
Percent American Indian 0.0 0.9 0.067   4.8 1.9 0.433  
          
Age 44.7 48.8 <0.001 ***  44.4 46.8 0.172  
Years at this school 3.6 6.1 <0.001 ***  4.0 5.1 0.005 ** 
Years taught at this school 0.1 1.1 <0.001 ***  0.2 0.4 0.509  
Years asst principal at this school 0.0 1.2 <0.001 ***  0.0 0.6 <0.001 *** 
Years principal at this school 3.6 3.7 0.013 *  3.8 3.9 0.470  
Total years taught 7.1 10.7 <0.001 ***  7.7 9.4 0.269  
Total years asst principal 0.4 3.3 <0.001 ***  0.2 2.8 <0.001 *** 
Total years as principal 3.7 3.8 0.833   3.8 3.9 0.382  
          
 
Notes: separate calculations for elementary/middle and high school subsamples. See Tables 4-5 for sample sizes. p value 
is from a t-test for a difference in means. *** indicates statistically significant difference at the 0.01 level; ** indicates 
statistically significant difference at the 0.05 level; * indicates statistically significant difference at the 0.01 level. 
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Appendix Table 2: Principal cohorts and years of available pre- and post- data 
 
Years of data observed Elementary/Middle  High school 
      
 APP Comparison  APP Comparison 
   First year as principal was 2004-05: 38 114  13 66 
      Pre: 2002-03 and 2003-04   Post: 2004-05 through 2007-08  27 90    
      Pre: 2003-04                       Post: 2004-05 through 2007-08  4  8 30 
      Pre: none                            Post: 2004-05 through 2007-08 10 18  4 35 
      Pre: none                            Post: 2005-06 through 2007-08  2  1  
      Pre: 2003-04                       Post: 2004-05 only     1 
      
   First year as principal was 2005-06: 31 116  9 39 
      Pre: 2002-03 through 2004-05   Post: 2005-06 through 2007-08 19 95    
      Pre: 2004-05                              Post: 2005-06 through 2007-08 3 7  5 24 
      Pre: 2003-04 and 2004-05          Post: 2005-06 through 2007-08     4 15 
      Pre: 2002-03 through 2004-05   Post: 2005-06  1    
      Pre: none                                   Post: 2005-06 through 2007-08 9 13    
      
Total 69 230  22 105 
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Appendix Table 3: Full regression results—model with controls, elementary and middle schools 
 
 Basic Model with Controls Pre- and Post-Trajectory Model with Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Math ELA Math ELA Math ELA Math ELA 
         
Prior year standardized score 0.739*** 0.706*** 0.367*** 0.323*** 0.733*** 0.703*** 0.366*** 0.323*** 
 (0.075) (0.071) (0.056) (0.047) (0.076) (0.073) (0.055) (0.047) 
         
APP school (one year before new principal) -0.013 -0.054** - - -0.019 -0.087*** - - 
 (0.018) (0.020)   (0.026) (0.027)   
         
Post new principal -0.008 -0.043*** -0.028** -0.034***     
 (0.017) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008)     
         
    APP * post new principal -0.042* 0.012 -0.033 0.019     
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015)     
         
2
nd
 or more years before new principal     0.000 -0.003 0.008 0.007 
     (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) 
         
   APP * 2
nd
 or more years before new principal     0.010 0.058* -0.002 0.058* 
     (0.032) (0.025) (0.030) (0.024) 
         
1
st
 year new principal     0.017 -0.042** -0.008 -0.038** 
     (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) 
         
   APP * 1
st
 year new principal     -0.056 0.040 -0.045 0.049 
     (0.039) (0.032) (0.034) (0.025) 
         
2
nd
 year new principal     -0.009 -0.030 -0.035* -0.012 
     (0.022) (0.018) (0.015) (0.013) 
         
   APP * 2
nd
 year new principal     -0.019 0.030 -0.025 0.041 
     (0.032) (0.025) (0.030) (0.023) 
         
3
rd
 or later year new principal     -0.056 -0.063* -0.062*** -0.031* 
     (0.031) (0.028) (0.017) (0.014) 
         
   APP * 3
rd
 or later year new principal     -0.034 0.057* -0.032 0.059** 
     (0.026) (0.023) (0.027) (0.020) 
         
Percent black -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.006** -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.006** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
         
Percent Hispanic -0.002* -0.002** -0.004* -0.006*** -0.002** -0.002** -0.004* -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
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 Basic Model with Controls Pre- and Post-Trajectory Model with Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Math ELA Math ELA Math ELA Math ELA 
         
Percent Asian or other 0.002** 0.000 0.005* -0.001 0.002** 0.000 0.006* -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
         
Percent recent immigrant -0.006** -0.002 -0.007*** 0.002 -0.008** -0.002 -0.009*** 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
         
Percent female 0.002* 0.003** 0.001 0.003* 0.001 0.003** 0.001 0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
         
Percent eligible for free lunch -0.000 -0.001* 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001* 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
Percent LEP -0.001 -0.004*** -0.004** -0.009*** -0.000 -0.004*** -0.003* -0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
Percent special education -0.001 -0.006*** 0.001 -0.005*** -0.004 -0.007*** -0.001 -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
Budget per student 0.003 -0.001 0.007*** -0.000 0.003 -0.001 0.007*** -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
Borough = Bronx 0.061 0.101**   0.060 0.101**   
 (0.036) (0.038)   (0.036) (0.038)   
         
Borough = Brooklyn 0.065* 0.067*   0.065* 0.066*   
 (0.026) (0.028)   (0.026) (0.028)   
         
Borough = Manhattan 0.040 0.088**   0.044 0.089**   
 (0.025) (0.031)   (0.026) (0.032)   
         
Borough = Queens 0.088* 0.087**   0.088* 0.087**   
 (0.035) (0.032)   (0.035) (0.033)   
         
School fixed effects NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
School level effects YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO 
         
Constant 0.057 0.092 0.199 0.413** 0.106 0.111 0.225 0.411** 
 (0.058) (0.053) (0.159) (0.147) (0.068) (0.067) (0.165) (0.148) 
         
N 1599 1597 1599 1597 1599 1597 1599 1597 
 
Notes: these are the complete results corresponding to columns (5) – (8) of Table 6 and 7. Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Appendix Table 4: Full regression results, elementary and middle school-by-grade models (with no additional controls) 
 
 Basic Model with Controls  Pre- and Post Trajectory Model with Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Math ELA Math ELA  Math ELA Math ELA 
          
Lagged standardized score 0.971*** 0.839*** 0.660*** 0.221***  0.971*** 0.847*** 0.650*** 0.245*** 
 (0.008) (0.032) (0.023) (0.060)  (0.008) (0.031) (0.022) (0.061) 
          
APP school -0.007 -0.058*    0.001 -0.057   
 (0.017) (0.026)    (0.031) (0.030)   
          
Post new principal 0.012 -0.048*** -0.012 -0.051***      
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)      
          
APP * post new principal -0.014 0.003 -0.017 -0.014      
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020)      
          
Two or more years before new principal      -0.058*** 0.133*** -0.055** 0.095*** 
      (0.016) (0.021) (0.019) (0.017) 
          
APP * two or more years before new principal      -0.013 -0.001 -0.013 0.012 
      (0.035) (0.032) (0.043) (0.038) 
          
First year new principal      0.042 -0.044* 0.026 -0.035 
      (0.025) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020) 
          
APP * first year new principal      -0.048 0.010 -0.043 -0.002 
      (0.050) (0.039) (0.052) (0.043) 
          
2
nd
 or later year for new principal      -0.049*** 0.060*** -0.077*** 0.020 
      (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) (0.015) 
          
APP * 2
nd
 or later year for new principal      -0.011 -0.000 -0.017 -0.008 
      (0.032) (0.028) (0.038) (0.033) 
          
Grade = 5 -0.074*** 0.151*** -0.060*** 0.085***  -0.075*** 0.153*** -0.061*** 0.089*** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010)  (0.014) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) 
          
Grade = 6 -0.027* 0.117*** 0.080*** 0.154***  -0.028* 0.119*** 0.080*** 0.156*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)  (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
          
Grade = 7 0.001 0.121*** 0.122*** 0.160***  0.001 0.121*** 0.123*** 0.161*** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)  (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
          
Grade = 8 0.100*** 0.087*** 0.249*** 0.101***  0.100*** 0.091*** 0.252*** 0.105*** 
 (0.011) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018)  (0.011) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) 
          
School fixed effects NO NO YES YES  NO NO YES YES 
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 Basic Model with Controls  Pre- and Post Trajectory Model with Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Math ELA Math ELA  Math ELA Math ELA 
          
Constant -0.001 -0.089*** -0.062*** -0.104***  0.034* -0.168*** -0.027 -0.163*** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012)  (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) 
          
N 4293 4270 4293 4270  4293 4270 4293 4270 
 
Notes: in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) standard errors allow for clustering by school. Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) are estimates from fixed effects models with robust 
standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  In columns (5) – (8), two or more years before new principal is the omitted category. 
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Appendix Table 5A: Full regression results, elementary and middle school-by-grade models (with controls 
and grade interactions) 
 
 No interactions No interactions Including interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Math ELA Math ELA Math ELA 
       
Lagged standardized score 0.845*** 0.524*** 0.626*** 0.181*** 0.635*** 0.169** 
 (0.017) (0.058) (0.022) (0.054) (0.022) (0.056) 
       
APP school -0.007 -0.055*     
 (0.017) (0.026)     
       
Post new principal 0.014 -0.085*** 0.007 -0.063*** 0.070*** -0.047*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) 
       
APP * post new principal -0.011 0.012 -0.015 -0.009 0.019 0.029 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.026) (0.028) 
       
Percent black -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.004** -0.010*** -0.003* -0.010*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
       
Percent Hispanic -0.001** -0.005*** -0.002 -0.008*** -0.002 -0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
       
Percent Asian or other 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
Percent recent immigrant 0.002 -0.010*** 0.007*** -0.008*** 0.007*** -0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
Percent female 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002* 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Percent eligible for free lunch -0.000 -0.001** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Percent LEP -0.004*** -0.004** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Percent special education 0.002* -0.009*** 0.003*** -0.005*** 0.002** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Borough = Bronx 0.048 0.155***     
 (0.025) (0.044)     
       
Borough = Brooklyn 0.070** 0.148***     
 (0.023) (0.043)     
       
Borough = Manhattan 0.072** 0.193***     
 (0.023) (0.046)     
       
Borough = Queens 0.073** 0.170***     
 (0.024) (0.044)     
       
Grade = 5 -0.074*** 0.111*** -0.065*** 0.073*** -0.016 0.069*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) 
       
Grade = 6 -0.032** 0.093*** 0.069*** 0.133*** 0.091*** 0.143*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.016) 
       
Grade = 7 -0.006 0.088*** 0.109*** 0.138*** 0.153*** 0.167*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.018) 
       
Grade = 8 0.102*** 0.032* 0.236*** 0.069*** 0.314*** 0.045 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.019) (0.018) (0.038) (0.041) 
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 No interactions No interactions Including interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Math ELA Math ELA Math ELA 
       
APP school * grade 5     0.009 0.034 
     (0.031) (0.030) 
       
APP school * grade 6     0.016 0.048 
     (0.040) (0.035) 
       
APP school * grade 7     -0.017 0.065 
     (0.041) (0.037) 
       
APP school * grade 8     -0.003 0.069 
     (0.074) (0.074) 
       
Post new principal * grade 5     -0.079*** -0.004 
     (0.018) (0.018) 
       
Post new principal * grade 6     -0.038* -0.034 
     (0.019) (0.018) 
       
Post new principal * grade 7     -0.065*** -0.058** 
     (0.019) (0.019) 
       
Post new principal * grade 8     -0.130** 0.021 
     (0.045) (0.045) 
       
APP * post * grade 5     -0.065 -0.010 
     (0.042) (0.038) 
       
APP * post * grade 6     -0.042 -0.015 
     (0.039) (0.036) 
       
APP * post * grade 7     -0.020 -0.071 
     (0.034) (0.037) 
       
APP * post * grade 8     -0.014 -0.060 
     (0.084) (0.082) 
       
School fixed effects NO NO YES YES YES YES 
       
Constant -0.051 0.153* 0.066 0.579*** 0.010 0.566*** 
 (0.042) (0.073) (0.124) (0.165) (0.127) (0.165) 
       
N 4293 4270 4293 4270 4293 4270 
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Appendix Table 5B: Full regression results, elementary and middle school-by-grade models (with controls and 
no grade interactions) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Math ELA Math ELA 
     
Lagged standardized score 0.830*** 0.538*** 0.612*** 0.197*** 
 (0.016) (0.058) (0.022) (0.054) 
     
APP school 0.003 -0.053   
 (0.028) (0.032)   
     
Two or more years before new principal -0.057*** 0.107*** -0.055** 0.080*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) 
     
APP * two or more years before new principal -0.016 -0.004 -0.009 0.019 
 (0.035) (0.028) (0.042) (0.038) 
     
First year new principal 0.035 -0.038* 0.025 -0.033 
 (0.025) (0.019) (0.023) (0.020) 
     
APP * first year new principal -0.048 0.006 -0.041 0.000 
 (0.051) (0.040) (0.051) (0.043) 
     
2
nd
 or later year for new principal -0.067*** -0.009 -0.079*** -0.003 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.017) (0.015) 
     
APP * 2
nd
 or later year for new principal -0.011 0.012 -0.012 0.005 
 (0.030) (0.027) (0.037) (0.033) 
     
Percent black -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.004** -0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
     
Percent Hispanic -0.001*** -0.005*** -0.003* -0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
     
Percent Asian or other 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
Percent recent immigrant -0.001 -0.008*** 0.003 -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
Percent female 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002* 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Percent eligible for free lunch -0.000 -0.001** 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Percent LEP -0.003*** -0.005** -0.005*** -0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Percent special education -0.002* -0.007*** -0.001 -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Borough = Bronx 0.043 0.154***   
 (0.023) (0.042)   
     
Borough = Brooklyn 0.070** 0.145***   
 (0.022) (0.040)   
     
Borough = Manhattan 0.074*** 0.189***   
 (0.022) (0.044)   
     
Borough = Queens 0.076*** 0.164***   
 (0.022) (0.042)   
     
Grade = 5 -0.073*** 0.113*** -0.064*** 0.075*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Math ELA Math ELA 
     
Grade = 6 -0.031** 0.093*** 0.071*** 0.134*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
     
Grade = 7 -0.005 0.088*** 0.113*** 0.138*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
     
Grade = 8 0.104*** 0.035* 0.241*** 0.071*** 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.019) (0.018) 
     
School effects NO NO YES YES 
     
Constant 0.038 0.073 0.156 0.476** 
 (0.040) (0.070) (0.123) (0.166) 
     
N 4293 4270 4293 4270 
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Appendix Table 6: APP high schools included in the study 
 
 
LCMS 
 
School 
 
BDS 
Year 
opened 
    
 APP 2005 Cohort (12)   
K477 Samuel Tilden H.S. 318477 1930 
K524 International High School at Prospect Heights 317524 2005 
K533 School for Democracy and Leadership 317533 2005 
K537 High School for Youth and Community Development at Erasmus 373537 2005 
M492 High School for Law, Advocacy, and Community Justice 103492 2003 
M685 Bread and Roses Integrated Arts High School 105685 1998 
M690 School for the Physical City 179690 1994 
M695 Urban Peace Academy 179695 1994 
X239 The Urban Assembly Academy for History and Citizenship for Young 
Men 
209239 2005 
X437 Fordham High School for the Arts 210437 2003 
X500 Hostos-Lincoln Academy of Science 207500 2005 
X543 High School for Violin and Dance
35
 212543 2003 
    
 APP 2006 Cohort (9)   
K350 The Urban Assembly School of Music and Art 313350 2006 
M299 High School for Arts, Imagination, and Inquiry 103299 2006 
M408      Professional Performing Arts High School 102408 1991 
M495      Park East High School 104495 2003 
M555      Central Park East Secondary High School 104555 1985 
M635      Academy of Environmental Science Secondary High School 104635 2001 
Q248      Queens Preparatory Academy 429248 2006 
Q259      Pathways College Preparatory School: A College Board School 429259 2006 
X321      Crotona Academy High School 279321 2005 
    
Notes: ―year‖ refers to Spring of the academic year. 
 
                                                 
35 Part of the Morris High School restructuring  
The Institute for Education and Social Policy is a joint research center of NYU’s Wagner and Stein-
hardt Schools.  Founded in 1995, IESP brings the talents of a diverse group of NYU faculty, graduate 
students and research scientists to bear on questions of education and social policy. We are one of the 
nation’s leading academic research centers addressing urban education issues and a substantial 
amount of our work focuses on New York City public schools and students. More information is 
available on our website at http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/iesp.
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